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Public and private improvisation
An aspect of American nation-building
Building the American state and nation in the 19th century is generally
described in large terms, such as the Civil War, the settling of the West, or
industrialization. These general categories of American history are often
connected in surprising ways, and one of these is the changing interrelationship
among the political authorities, state and national, the private companies that
built and owned the railroads, and army officers who gave support, suggestions,
and engineering aid to the railroads. These three factions, two public and one
private, operating both locally and nationally, combined to create an
infrastructure that both tied the nation together across the continent, and helped
America survive the crisis of secession and war. Robert Angevine's outstanding
book on The Railroad and the State describes the process and the problems
whereby the army, the railroads, and the government came together.
In America, unlike continental Europe, the national government did not
create a central plan for rail construction. Before the war, most Americans
regarded the constitution as a treaty between sovereign states rather than the
fundamental law of the nation, and almost all regarded the enumerate powers
allotted to Congress and the President as the limits of constitutional government
rather than its starting point. The political culture of prewar America was
focused upon the states, which were considered the proper agents for large scale
internal improvement. Even the states, however, were not the primary agents in
building the rail system; that role fell to private, though usually politically
connected, companies that raised capital by selling stocks and bonds. The
companies promised profits to investors and economic growth to the
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communities that assisted them with rights of way and financial inducements.
But the railroad companies, though flush with promoters, were woefully short of
engineers, and here the army could help. West Point was the leading engineering
school in America in the 1820s and 1830s, and the military policy did not then
forbid army officers from working as surveyors and civil engineers for the
expanding railroads. Although army officers were technically on loan (or worked
in their free time, or took extended leave) they functioned in a civilian rather
than military capacity, and often found the pay and prestige of railroad work
more enticing than routine garrison duty. Without central direction, individual
railroads combined their need for technical skill with army officers' engineering
education and local community's desire for economic development into a
burgeoning rail network in prewar America.
The Civil War and the needs of post-Appomattox transportation brought
changes in the American way of railroad building. Initially focused on local,
limited markets with only modest capital investment, the railroad became a
national industry dependant upon Congressional action, army deployment, and
continuing access to national financial markets. In the West, unvanquished
Indian tribes and the absence of preexisting towns and markets made a national
rail focus inevitable, and military leaders from Grant to Sherman to Sheridan
were enthusiastic about the transcontinental systems. The role of the military
shifted from engineering to protection against hostile Native Americans, and the
national government helped support the progress financially while private
companies pushed the new lines west toward dreams of gold and land. The
railroads grew from local into national companies capitalized in New York and
beyond the reach of local control, and the federal government became the focal
point of financial aid on the one hand and political regulation on the other. The
function of the railroads in the Indian wars and the consolidation of the frontier
army in large permanent posts is one theme of his last substantive chapter.
Angevine describes the shift in scale and institutional focus in clear, careful, and
persuasive prose.
The Spanish-American War in 1898 exposed a massive lack of coordination
between the army and the roads it helped survey, engineer, and protect. The
military had no central plan to use the rail system of 1898 to transport troops and
supplies. The choice of Tampa as the central port of embarkation for the
Carribean made things worse, since the city had two lines leading north but only
one from city to port. The railroad, in spite of contractual obligation to be
prepared to move the military, had made no plans to do so, and was disinclined
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to disrupt profitable civilian passenger and freight service to accommodate the
army. The army began mobilizing in April, and a month later, rail traffic clogged
up throughout the Gulf South. Nonetheless, in spite of incompetence,
obstruction, and general lack of logistical preparation, the army and the railroads
straightened the traffic jam out by the end of June. Improvisation and on-the-job
training triumphed over a lack of planning. Still, it was an ironic ending to nearly
a century of cooperation, as the railroads, the national government and the army
had drifted in different directions.
As is common for a good work of history, Angevine's book leads to avenues
of investigation and interpretation suggested by its research and thesis that are
beyond the boundaries of the present text. Angevine describes the American way
of building railroads as one of improvisation and experiment, with local
boosterism complementing private ownership, all mixed with political log rolling
and imaginative fiscal expedients, and supported technically by the army. While
this lack of system might be hard to defend, it worked at least as well in the 19th
century as did the more nationally planned European rail grids. As Angevine
points out, the technology changed rapidly in the first half century of railroading,
not only in rail and rolling stock, but also in telegraph and bridging. American
diversity of rail lines, along with the invariable preference for cheap initial
construction to be replaced with better lines later on, allowed American railroads
to keep abreast of technological and engineering improvement throughout the
century. This main theme of Angevine's book raises implicit questions about the
usefulness of modern, centrally directed industrial policy, where planning is
inevitably based upon a particular level of technological developments in spite of
continuing technological change. Angevine's book deals with major historical
issues that go beyond the formal scope of his essay, a primary indication of a
book that is not only good but also important.
James D. Hardy, Jr. is a professor of history in the Honors College at
Louisiana State University and has published several books on both history and
literature, including one on baseball.

Published by LSU Digital Commons, 2005

3

